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From Complacency to Crisis: 
Financial Risk Taking in the Early 21st Century
by Danielle DiMartino, John V. Duca and Harvey Rosenblum
During the first half of this decade, the belief that new financial products 
would adequately shield investors from risk encouraged financial flows to less credit- 
worthy households and businesses. By late 2006, U.S. financial markets were flashing 
warning signals of a potential financial crisis. 
In a sign that investors had become too complacent, risk premiums had all 
but vanished in junk bond and emerging-market interest rate spreads. Then, conditions 
changed abruptly. In the important and usually stable market for asset-backed com-
mercial paper, premiums on three-month paper over Treasury bills jumped from 0.17 
percentage point in February 2007 to 2.15 points in August. Meanwhile, rising subprime 
mortgage defaults led investors to abandon their sanguine beliefs about the risk of many 
mortgage and nonmortgage products.
The backdrop for these events was a period of macroeconomic stability that fed 
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complacency about risk. This relatively 
benign economic environment, when 
combined with the new, structured 
financial products, increased financial 
flows to nonprime mortgage and busi-
ness borrowers. The result was an 
overeager acceptance of risk taking 
that began correcting itself only after 
mounting subprime mortgage defaults 
reverberated through the broader 
financial markets. 
The Rise of Complacency
Investors have long expected to 
be compensated for taking greater 
risk with higher expected returns. A 
vital role of financial markets is to cor-
rectly price risk so investors can make 
informed decisions. From 2002 through 
the early months of 2007, however, 
differentials between risk-free and risky 
assets had narrowed significantly. 
In mid-2007—the most benign 
point in the current credit cycle—junk 
bonds paid about 3 percentage points 
above comparable-maturity Treasuries, 
down from the historic average of 
around 5 points, a level last seen in 
mium above Treasury rates because of 
its moderate risk.
Interest Rate Risk. Swings in 
interest rates affect the present value 
of future stock and bond payments 
to investors. In an uncertain environ-
ment—where rates fluctuate greatly 
because of instability in prices or eco-
nomic growth—the payments’ present 
value is more variable, rendering stock 
and bond prices more volatile.
Changes in Risk Appetite. 
Investors sometimes accept relatively 
low premiums to take on a given 
level of risk; other times, they demand 
higher premiums for the same risk. 
The primary determinants are default 
and interest rate risks, but liquidity risk 
can also lower the price of some assets 
when trading thins during periods of 
great uncertainty. At such times, the 
prices of some assets can fall sharply 
with little or no warning signs. Hence, 
overall investor appetite for risk 
depends on market psychology.
While it’s difficult to break down 
premiums into perceived risk and the 
market price of risk, evidence sug-
late 2003 (Chart 1). Shrinking the 
spread were greater macroeconomic 
stability and new products designed to 
divide risk, which lowered the premi-
ums demanded for investing in vari-
ous instruments. To understand this, 
it’s helpful to look at three aspects of 
risk—default risk, interest rate risk  
and changes in investors’ appetite for 
risk.
Default Risk. This is the pos-
sibility that investors may not get back 
their principal at maturity or receive 
interest payments in full or on time. 
Default risk reflects the characteristics 
of a firm or its industry and the pos-
sibility of recession. Volatile economic 
growth, for example, can adversely 
affect firms’ and households’ ability to 
service debt.
At one end of the spectrum are 
default-free Treasury bonds. At the 
other is below-investment-grade cor-
porate debt, which typically pays a 
sizable premium above Treasury yields 
to compensate for added risk. In the 
middle is investment-grade corporate 
debt, which usually pays a smaller pre-
Chart 1
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gests that swings in premiums and 
discount factors have a big impact on 
returns beyond what might be justi-
fied by changes in asset fundamentals, 
such as profit growth and the risk-free 
Treasury yield.1 For this reason, inves-
tors face the possibility that an asset’s 
market price could fall if premiums 
rise. Even if some individual investors 
remain calm during unsettled periods, 
market values may plunge if others 
suddenly demand higher premiums. 
When this occurs, investors generally 
sell high-risk assets and buy low-risk 
assets, a phenomenon known as a 
flight to quality. 
The three main aspects of risk 
fell dramatically the first half of this 
decade, partly because of a more 
stable macroeconomic environment 
and increased investor confidence. 
These risks were also affected by the 
adoption of the new financial instru-
ments and practices, which at a micro-
economic level reduced perceived 
credit and price risk. The combination 
of improved macroeconomic perfor-
mance and microeconomic financial 
innovation meant low defaults and 
low asset-price volatility, whetting the 
appetite for a new generation of secu-
rities that funneled more money to 
riskier firms and households.
Indeed, several gauges imply that 
investors’ risk tolerance was high in 
mid-decade. The Credit Suisse Global 
Risk Appetite Index, which tracks 64 
stock and bond markets, measures the 
extent to which asset prices have risen 
because risk premiums have fallen, 
ostensibly because of investors’ declin-
ing concern about risk.2 The index 
began gyrating upward in early 2003, 
with a brief interruption in spring 
2006, when automakers’ debt ratings 
were downgraded (Chart 2). A new 
downturn began in August 2007. 
The high tolerance for risk in the 
middle of the current decade partly 
reflects greater stability in asset prices. 
Such indicators as the spread between 
yields on emerging-market debt and 
comparable-maturity Treasury bonds 
fell to extremely low levels (Chart 3). 
Chart 3
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In January 2007, stock volatility mea-
sures were at their lowest since 1993.
Macroeconomic Stability 
All three aspects of risk fall when 
recession and inflation pose less of a 
threat, which is what has happened in 
recent years—by almost any measure. 
An entire generation of Americans 
has scant experience with recessions, 
thanks to a greatly improved economic 
environment. Since 1982, the economy 
has seen two brief and shallow reces-
sions—one in 1991, the other in 2001 
(Chart 4). In those 25 years, the U.S. 
economy has been in recession for 
only 16 months—roughly 5 percent of 
the time. 
The U.K. and Canada have also 
had fewer downturns. However, not 
all major countries are seeing the same 
trend. Japan, France, Germany and 
Italy have had more frequent econom-
ic downturns in the past 15 years.
Investors’ comfort level has also 
been reinforced by their experience 
with inflation. Among the seven largest 
developed economies—the U.S., U.K., 
Germany, France, Italy, Canada and 
Japan—inflation has converged over 
the past 15 years to low annual rates. 
At the same time, emerging economies 
once plagued by high inflation have 
seen price pressures recede and move 
toward the low levels of advanced 
countries.
While the risk of rising prices 
hasn’t disappeared, inflation has be-
come lower and more predictable. 
Dallas Fed economist Tao Wu finds 
that the inflation premium on five-year 
Treasury bonds has fallen to near zero 
in recent years, down from around 2.5 
percentage points in the early 1980s 
(Chart 5).3 The steep drop implies that 
inflation risk is a less important factor 
in interest rate volatility.
Recession risk and inflation are 
two primary drivers of interest rates. 
Since both have diminished, it’s not 
surprising that the relationship between 
short- and long-term rates has been 
unusual in recent years. From 2001 
to mid-2004, rates on such short-term 
instruments as three-month Treasuries 
declined and then leveled off. They 
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then rose steeply through August 2006 
(Chart 6). Over the past seven years, 
however, long-term bond yields barely 
budged, departing from the textbook 
pattern of the 1980s and 1990s, when 
interest rates for bonds with different 
maturities tended to move together.4 
This change may also reflect the 
deepening of the Treasury market 
arising from the increased demand 
of foreign investors, particularly from 
large emerging economies, where 
growth has fueled dramatic increases 
in savings.5 
Slicing and Dicing Risk
Along with greater macroeco-
nomic stability came financial innova-
tions that contributed to the post-1990 
decline in the premiums investors 
require to hold long-term securities. 
The new products have helped reduce 
other risk premiums as well. 
For example, the market has been 
expanding for Treasury derivatives, 
which allow investors to take on or 
shed the risk of bond price move-
ments. This has enabled investors in 
long-term government bonds to reduce 
their exposure to interest rate risk with 
instruments that shift some of it to 
more risk-tolerant investors. 
Other innovations have helped 
debt investors reduce their exposure to 
default risk. Two noteworthy examples 
are the credit default swap (CDS), pri-
marily used to mitigate default risk on 
corporate debt, and the collateralized 
debt obligation, popular for repackag-
ing subprime-mortgage-backed securi-
ties and many of the loans financing 
the current cycle’s leveraged-buyout 
boom (see glossary on back page).
A CDS transfers default risk from 
bondholders to CDS sellers, which 
guarantee the creditworthiness of the 
underlying bonds. If default occurs, 
the seller either takes delivery of the 
defaulted bond for the par value or 
pays the bondholder the difference 
between the par and recovery values. 
Because there’s no requirement to 
hold the actual bond, much of the 
growth in the CDS market is attribut-
Chart 5
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able to investors speculating on swings 
in credit spreads. CDS trading volume 
has risen dramatically, from $631 bil-
lion in 2000 to over $45 trillion by 
mid-2007, according to International 
Swaps and Derivatives.
In recent years, investors have 
only needed to place one-way bets on 
credit spread movements. With reces-
sion and inflation risk seemingly van-
quished, the spread between interest 
rates on high-yield, or junk, bonds and 
equivalent-maturity Treasuries trended 
downward for several years before 
hitting a record low in June 2007 (see 
Chart 1). 
The decline didn’t stem from a 
drop in high-yield-bond issuance but 
from technological and macroeconom-
ic factors that enabled less creditwor-
thy firms to increasingly tap the capital 
markets.6 In the early 1980s, high-yield 
issues constituted about one-third of 
all new corporate bonds sold in the 
U.S. By mid-2007, they accounted for 
two-thirds, reflecting their growing 
importance as a source of business 
financing.7 
Also contributing to this move out 
on the risk spectrum was investors’ 
demand for higher yields as long-term 
interest rates continued falling. This 
induced lenders to extend capital 
management topping $600 billion at 
the end of 2006—two and a half times 
what they were in 2000. Private-equity 
firms may be best known in the cur-
rent business cycle for buying out 
public shareholders, taking companies 
private, and replacing public equity 
with debt or private-equity stakes. In 
doing so, they often employ greater 
leverage than banks to increase their 
bargaining positions and take on more 
risk in lending to corporate clients.
Flows to nonprime firms and 
households have also been enhanced 
by conduits, particularly structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs). These off-
balance-sheet vehicles issue medium-
term debt and commercial paper (CP), 
the highly rated, short-term notes that 
offer investors a higher yield than 
certificates of deposit or similar-term 
Treasuries. 
Conduits use the proceeds from 
issuing debt to purchase longer-term 
debt, including corporate bonds, 
accounts receivables, auto loans, mort-
gages and credit card debt. Conduits 
earn profits from the spread between 
yields on the paper issued and the 
investments. Some conduits are con-
trolled by and earn profits for banks 
but aren’t technically owned by the 
banks and don’t appear on their bal-
ance sheets. In mid-2007, there were 
30 SIVs with $400 billion in assets.
The rapid rise of hedge funds, 
private-equity financing and other 
nontraditional investment vehicles 
often based on derivatives and other 
structured products created new chan-
nels to increase the flow of capital to 
nonprime firms (Chart 7B). 
Financial innovations have also 
opened up new ways for less cred-
itworthy households to obtain home 
loans, resulting in a new era in the 
mortgage markets. Through the 1970s, 
homebuyers with solid credit usually 
obtained mortgages from banks, which 
funded the loans with deposits from 
savers and investors and held them in 
portfolio. These loans became known 
as “prime” because they went to bor-
rowers with good credit, who made 
to the least creditworthy borrow-
ers—those rated Ccc or below. After 
averaging 4 percent a year from 1980 
to 2003, Ccc borrowers captured an 
average annual share of 19 percent of 
total high-yield issuance between 2004 
and the first quarter of 2007. From 
August through September 2007, Ccc 
claimed a record 25.4 percent of high-
yield bond issuance.
Despite the growing share of 
low-rated borrowers, spreads hovered 
near record lows in spring 2007. Once 
again, financial markets signaled that 
investors saw little threat of recession. 
After all, during economic slowdowns 
junk bonds tend to be the first to 
default. If anything, the narrow spreads 
supported the idea that an inverted 
yield curve—with short-term rates 
above long-term ones—had lost its 
capacity to predict downturns and was 
giving an overly pessimistic reading of 
the economy’s future.8
Extremely low corporate default 
rates encouraged the narrow spreads. 
According to Moody’s, the default 
rate across all high-yield issuers was 
1.27 percent in September 2007, near 
the post-1990 low of 1.37 percent in 
April 1997 and well below the 3.4 
percent annual average since 1970. 
Remarkably, no defaults occurred in 
February and March 2007, the first 
default-free months since 1997.
Further downward pressure on 
junk spreads arose from increased 
demand for high-yield bonds from the 
growing number of hedge funds. In 
mid-2007, fund assets under manage-
ment climbed to $1.7 trillion, up from 
$490 billion in 2000. Accounting for 
leverage, McKinsey & Co. estimates 
that hedge funds controlled $6 trillion 
in assets in mid-2007, close to the $8.6 
trillion in assets on commercial bank 
balance sheets at that time.9 As hedge 
funds grew, their positions in deriva-
tives, on net, likely assumed some of 
the risks of stocks and bonds, enhanc-
ing these securities’ appeal for tradi-
tional investors (Chart 7A).10 
Private-equity funds’ role has also 
grown significantly, with assets under 
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down payments of at least 10 to 20 
percent, took on manageable monthly 
payments and fully documented their 
income. 
By the 1980s, the broadening of 
the residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties (RMBS) market allowed origina-
tors to make home loans that weren’t 
funded by deposits. Instead, they sold 
mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, government-sponsored enter-
prises that packaged them into RMBS, 
which were sold with a guarantee 
against default on the underlying mort-
gages.11 Investors generally perceived 
the guarantees as rock-solid, partly 
because the two enterprises were 
viewed as being backed by the U.S. 
government.
In the first half of the current 
decade, two types of financial innova-
tions opened mortgage financing to 
nonprime borrowers—people deemed 
riskier because of their credit history or 
uncertain income prospects. First, lend-
ers adopted credit-scoring models from 
the auto loan market to sort applicants 
by creditworthiness and charge them 
appropriate, risk-based interest. This 
facilitated the screening of nonprime 
borrowers but left the problem of 
funding loans that exposed lenders 
and RMBS investors to higher default 
risk. The solution came in the form of 
new structured financial instruments 
that gave investors the confidence to 
fund nonprime mortgages.
The approach that gained the 
greatest acceptance involved consoli-
dating loan payments from pools of 
nonprime mortgages into collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs). To make 
these securities marketable, their struc-
ture divides the income streams from 
mortgages into tranches, whose credit 
ratings reflect both the quality of the 
underlying loans and the assignment 
of progressive default losses (Chart 8). 
The first income streams are assigned 
to tranches receiving the highest (Aaa) 
credit rating, reflecting the lowest 
probability of default. The largest per-
centage of mortgage CDO assets falls 
into this tranche.
Chart 7
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The remaining tranches carry suc-
cessively lower credit ratings, based 
on increasingly smaller claims on the 
cash flows of the underlying mort-
gages. CDOs’ bottom tier—the equity 
tranche—absorbs the first defaults on 
the mortgages. This tranche isn’t rated, 
carries the greatest risk and produces 
the highest potential returns. If all 
goes according to plan, only the lower 
tranches absorb default losses. 
Many investors formed their 
expectations by relying on the experi-
ence of the first half of the current 
decade, a period characterized by 
rapid home price increases and low 
default rates. The assumptions proved 
entirely too optimistic when the hous-
ing and mortgage markets came under 
stress in the middle of the decade.
The same basic structure of the 
CDOs was applied to business debt 
in the form of collateralized loan obli-
gations (CLOs), whose rapid growth 
has helped fund the recent leveraged-
buyout boom. In many respects, the 
growth of leveraged loans and CLOs 
parallels the growth of nonprime 
mortgages and CDOs. Leveraged loan 
issuance jumped from $138 billion in 
2001 to $485 billion in 2006, while 
nonprime mortgage issuance surged 
from $98 billion to $565 billion. Before 
the recent credit market turmoil, lever-
aged loan originations were on track 
for a $745 billion annual pace in 2007. 
Greater use of structured financial 
instruments like CDOs and CLOs facili-
tated the rapid growth of nonprime 
mortgages and leveraged loans. The 
ready market for these innovations 
reflected declines in risk premiums 
that stemmed not only from optimistic 
forecasts about default and interest rate 
risks but also from an increased appe-
tite for risk. Financial markets persisted 
like this for several years, but it caught 
up with investors in mid-2007.
Unwinding Complacency
A high tolerance for risk taking is 
unlikely to last for long. Investors lose 
their taste for it, and unforeseen events 
test unwarranted exuberance, a les-
son underscored by the wide swings 
in the Credit Suisse index (see Chart 
2). Periods of excess risk taking often 
reflect investors’ unrealistic assump-
Chart 8
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tions about the risks of new financial 
practices—risks fully appreciated only 
in hindsight. That has proven to be the 
case with CDOs.
In early 2007, defaults on non-
prime mortgages exceeded expecta-
tions, leaving investors in high-rated 
CDO tranches vulnerable to losses and 
triggering uncertainty about CDO valu-
ations. The default losses penetrated 
into the higher-rated tranches, beyond 
the expectations based on the pre-2006 
experience (see Chart 8). 
On August 14, three European 
investment funds were unable to 
price assets linked to subprime mort-
gages because of sudden illiquid-
ity in these markets. As a result, the 
funds froze redemptions, setting off 
a panic in the broader markets. The 
demand for liquidity created a spike 
in interest rates on overnight reserves. 
The London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), a key short-term rate at 
which banks lend each other funds, 
jumped sharply.
Central banks swiftly intervened, 
injecting reserves into their financial 
systems to prevent overnight rates 
from rising above their targets. In the 
U.S., the Federal Reserve lowered the 
interest rate at which banks could bor-
row at the discount window. Because 
intraday demand for funds was so 
volatile, an overabundance of reserves 
sometimes pushed the federal funds 
rate below its then-target of 5.25 
percent.
Although central banks took 
action to keep markets function-
ing, commercial banks have so far 
been reluctant to extend each other 
credit. This can be seen in the widen-
ing spread between the three-month 
LIBOR and the federal funds rate 
target. Months after the initial crisis, 
LIBOR remains elevated, indicating that 
full confidence has yet to be restored 
(Chart 9). This has wide-ranging impli-
cations because many prime as well as 
nonprime business loans and adjust-
able-rate mortgages have interest rates 
indexed to LIBOR.
Some analysts have predicted 
that investors’ risk tolerance won’t 
soon return to the high levels of 
mid-decade. This would be a healthy 
development for credit markets, which 
had underpriced risk. Reflecting the 
shift to more sober attitudes, junk 
bond spreads jumped from near-record 
lows in early summer to above-average 
levels by late November, even though 
the default rate on the bonds fell to 
1.13 percent in October, its lowest in 
25 years.
More broadly, the rise in credit 
spreads reflects curtailed financial flows 
to nonprime firms and affects the costs 
of such financing. Even prime firms are 
finding constricted credit flows in some 
markets. Commercial paper rates have 
risen relative to Treasury rates, and 
asset-backed volumes have dropped 
sharply (Charts 10 and 11). 
Leveraged-loan originations fell to 
$6.4 billion in August after averaging 
$61 billion a month in the first half of 
2007. The stagnation in this market has 
left many financial institutions with a 
large volume of loans on their balance 
sheets. To complete the leveraged-
buyout deals agreed to before financial 
markets became unsettled last summer, 
these loans must be priced and sold 
in the secondary markets. Issuance of 
CLOs, however, hasn’t returned to the 
levels seen before late summer.
Financial flows to nonprime 
households were similarly affected by 
the recent credit crisis. Even before 
last summer, they had experienced 
a severe pullback. The recent credit 
crisis has prompted lenders to further 
tighten credit standards for subprime 
and Alternative-A mortgages, which 
also go to nonprime applicants.
Investors’ reduced purchases 
of RMBS uninsured against default 
effectively tightened credit standards 
for jumbo mortgages, which exceed 
the size Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
can buy. As a result, jumbo financing 
became harder to obtain, and interest 
rates rose by about 1 percentage point 
above their June levels, implying a 
roughly 20 percent jump in payments 
on a given size mortgage.
The use of new and untested 
securities to fund nonprime loans to 
Chart 9
Spread Between 3-Month LIBOR and Federal Funds  


















SOURCE: Bloomberg.	 EconomicLetter	 FeDerAl reServe BAnk oF DAllAS 10 	 FeDerAl reServe BAnk oF DAllAS  EconomicLetter
Chart 11
















SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
Chart 10
Spread Between Commercial Paper and Treasury Rates 
Jumps in Late Summer 2007
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households has been the Achilles’ heel 
of the recent mortgage boom. Heavy 
reliance on CDOs based on nonprime 
mortgages—and the loss of confidence 
in them—has been a drag on a hous-
ing market already burdened with a 
large oversupply and stagnant or falling 
prices. 
Nonprime firms, which relied 
on banks for most of their financing 
30 years ago, depend today on some 
of the same structures as nonprime 
households to fund their operations. 
While pooling mortgages into securi-
ties has facilitated financial flows to 
nonprime households and firms, it 
has also encouraged loose lending 
standards that have buckled under 
the stress of the recent credit market 
upheaval. 
In one sense, the financial turmoil 
represents an abrupt return to more 
sustainable and sober-minded risk tak-
ing by investors. As a recent Financial 
Times article noted, “Corporate treasur-
ers are no longer investing in things 
they don’t understand.”12
Like investors, lenders are tak-
ing a more cautious approach. Banks 
had been tightening standards for real 
estate loans since late 2006, respond-
ing to weakening housing and mort-
gage market conditions. A July 2007 
Federal Reserve survey found banks 
were imposing stricter standards for 
several types of non-real estate loans, 
and an October survey found an accel-
eration of the trend. 
This more general tightening may 
reflect greater near-term uncertainty, 
lower risk appetite and concerns that 
mounting subprime losses may eat 
enough into bank equity-capital cush-
ions to impair some banks’ ability to 
both lend and meet capital standards. 
Such concerns grew in November, 
when credit spreads again increased 
and U.S. and international stock prices 
experienced sizable declines.
Valuable Lessons
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the groundwork for the 2007 credit 
crisis, when many of these instruments 
were first put to the test. With wide-
spread subprime mortgage defaults, 
many structured products—from 
private mortgage-backed securities to 
asset-backed commercial paper—failed 
to perform as expected. 
It wasn’t just a case of investors 
not appreciating the complexity of 
these products. The financial engineers 
who created and used them were 
also unprepared for how the products 
would trade—or fail to trade—in a 
less liquid environment. The combina-
tion of opacity, illiquidity and inability 
to ascertain prices for structured prod-
ucts resulted in a swift loss of investor 
confidence.13
By early November, the situation 
seemed to have improved; but then 
signs of financial distress again picked 
up, leaving the credit markets vulner-
able to lower issuance volumes and 
limited trading of existing structured 
products. Should these conditions per-
sist, the reduced availability of credit to 
nonprime firms and households could 
hurt overall economic growth. 
Valuable lessons have emerged 
from the financial market turmoil. 
Principal among them is that there is 
risk inherent in pricing products off 
thinly traded securities. At the root 
of the disruption was three hedge 
funds’ freezing of investor redemptions 
because of an inability to price securi-
ties valued off subprime mortgages. 
This news exacerbated the troubled 
trading environment, thereby triggering 
a seizing up of the riskier segments of 
the credit markets. 
Perhaps the 2007 credit crunch 
has taught investors they should not 
overlook the close links among default 
risk, interest rate risk and risk appe-
tite—and they should not underesti-
mate these aspects of risk when times 
are good. The slicing and dicing, and 
thereby transferring and spreading, 
of risk were more attractive in theory 
than in practice when these financial 
innovations were put to the test. 
Realistic assessments of these 
products’ risk will hopefully lead to 
their more appropriate use in the 
future. More important, the return of 
more sustainable risk taking in general 
should be healthy in the long run. 
The abruptness of this transition, how-
ever, poses challenges for maintaining 
sustainable macroeconomic growth 
and price stability over the short and 
medium terms.
DiMartino is an economics writer, Duca is a 
vice president and senior policy advisor, and 
Rosenblum is executive vice president and direc-
tor of research in the Research Department of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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Glossary of Terms
in Early 21st Century Finance
Collateralized debt obligations (CDO)—Structured credit products backed by pools of 
other assets. CDOs apportion the credit risk of a common pool of assets by assigning cash 
flows to different “tranches.” The most senior tranche is the first to receive cash flows and 
has the lowest risk of default and the highest credit rating. Lower tranches have claims to 
subordinate cash flows, and they’re deemed riskier with an appropriately lower credit rating. 
The most subordinate tranche is called the equity and suffers the first defaults; in the best of 
credit environments, it generates the highest return. 
Collateralized loan obligations (CLO)—A type of CDO, they’re backed by a pool of bank 
and/or nonbank loans, which are sold as different tranches to investors. CLOs arose in the 
mid-1990s to enable banks to sell loans and avoid holding regulatory capital. Early CLOs 
were mainly backed by loans to investment-grade companies. Today, they’re predominantly 
backed by loans to below-investment-grade corporations, or leveraged loans.
Conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIV)—Off-balance-sheet bank vehicles 
that issue short-term commercial paper and medium-term notes. The funds are invested 
in higher-yielding, longer-term assets such as mortgage-backed securities and credit card 
debt. These entities earn a profit for banks but are technically not owned by banks and don’t 
appear on bank balance sheets. The banks earn a profit from the spread between yields on 
the paper issued and the investments. 
Credit default swaps (CDS)—Contracts undertaken by two counterparties who agree to 
isolate and separately trade the credit risk of a third party. The CDS buyer, who typically 
owns debt in the corporation, pays a periodic fee to the seller. In the event of default, the 
seller either takes delivery of the defaulted bond or pays the buyer the difference between the 
bond’s par value and recovery value. 
Hedge funds—Private investment funds open only to a limited range of “accredited” inves-
tors, a restriction that exempts hedge funds from direct regulation. Hedge funds can invest 
in many assets depending on their self-imposed guidelines. They can take investment posi-
tions that yield profits if an asset price either rises (being “long”) or falls (being “short”) 
and can invest in complex securities such as futures, options and other structured products. 
Hedge funds aim to generate high returns that aren’t closely correlated with broader financial 
returns.
Leveraged loans—Business bank loans made to nonprime issuers bearing floating interest 
rates based off LIBOR, a widely used international floating rate interest rate index. These 
loans have repayment priority over most other debt. CLOs are the largest purchaser of lever-
aged loans, followed by hedge funds.
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—A daily reference rate published by the British 
Bankers Association. LIBOR reflects the interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured 
funds to other banks. LIBOR is often used as an index for adjustable-rate mortgages. 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)—A security whose cash flows are backed by the princi-
pal and interest payments from a pool of mortgage loans. Payments are made monthly and 
last as long as the maturity of the underlying mortgages. Residential mortgage-backed secu-
rities (RMBS) are backed by home mortgages, and commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) are backed by commercial and multifamily properties. 
Private-equity funds—They invest directly in companies and business units with the aim of 
gaining control and being in a position to make fundamental changes in the target’s capital 
structure, management and operations. Target companies are taken private, restructured 
over a typical period of three to seven years and then re-listed through an initial public offer-
ing. The most common tack for a restructuring is a leveraged buyout; other forms of private 
equity include venture capital and bridge financing.